Following our Marathon theme, I want to compare the legislative decision to criminalize competition violations, articulation of the goals of the law, preparation for and prosecution of these cases, and finally evaluating the performance, to training for and running a race. The stages of this marathon are, first, making the decision to run; second, setting personal goals; third, identifying the specific challenges; fourth, participating in the marathon; and, finally, evaluating the experience and planning for future marathons.
Subject to punishment 7
Like Hart, Ashworth assumes that a criminal conviction carries a significant measure of stigma and constitutes punishment, whether or not additional criminal penalties are attached. Kadish agrees that a "central distinguishing aspect of the criminal sanction appears to be the stigmatization of the morally culpable." 8 The U.S. Justice Department views criminal enforcement against cartels as "the core priority of antitrust law."
9 Since 1998, the OECD has condemned horizontal cartels in the strongest possible terms, calling hard core cartels "the most egregious violations of competition law" because they directly harm consumers, raise prices and limit output. 10 The Council recommended that States "ensure that their competition laws effectively halt and deter hard core cartels," and cooperate in investigating and sharing information, but did not specifically recommend that States adopt criminal penalties for these egregious violations. The Council Recommendation merely mandates States to "ensure" that their laws halt and deter cartels by empowering enforcement agencies, providing effective procedures, and sanctions "of a kind and at a level" sufficient to deter cartels.
The expressive power of the criminal sanction begins well before the imposition of a criminal sentence, 11 conviction or trial. The subjective and objective punishment arguably begins as early as the initiation of a criminal investigation, including the uniquely intimidating grand jury proceedings. 12 Although modern grand jury practice varies somewhat by jurisdiction and state, the most traditional grand jury proceedings are limited to the grand jury members, a court reporter, translators if required, members of the prosecution team and the witness. Attorneys for the witnesses are not permitted to be in the grand jury room to provide advice and Anti-Cartel Enforcement, 2004 ICN Cartels Workshop (Sydney, Australia, Nov. 21, 2004 ) (characterizing cartels as devoid of justification and causing significant economic harm.) Mr. Pate cited the U.S. Supreme Court's description of cartels as the "supreme evil of antitrust," though the Court did not address whether or not criminal penalties were necessary to punish cartel behavior, Verizon Comm, Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) . 10 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Hard Core Cartels, OECD Document No. C(98)35/final (March 25, 1998) , available at http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=193&InstrumentPID=189&Lang=en&B ook=False 11 Criminal sanctions include both incarceration, for individual offenders, and fines, for individuals and corporate entities, which traditionally cannot be imprisoned. 12 The 5 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires indictment by a grand jury in certain situations, providing that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury…" See generally US Dep't of Justice Division Manual at III-81 (last updated Nov. 2012 , available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/index.html ) (hereinafter referred to as Antitrust Division Manual) (describing the procedures and approval process required to convene a grand jury.).
assistance; witnesses are permitted to request time to leave the room to consult their counsel and then return to continue testifying.
The role of the grand jury is to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the target individual(s) or corporation(s) committed the crime(s). For that reason, the proceedings are one-sided. Potential defendants are not authorized to present a defense or exculpatory witnesses in the most traditional version of the grand jury. Moreover, grand jury proceedings in complex cases such as antitrust may be long drawn-out affairs.
13 Unless there is a reason to seal the indictment, indictments are typically made public when they are handed up by the grand jury.
14 Following indictment, criminal defendants are arraigned, ordinarily in open court, with attendant publicity, and the case proceeds to limited pre-trial discovery, motion practice, and criminal trial. 15 The length and publicity of criminal proceedings have the undoubted effect of punishment of the accused individuals and even corporate entities that are subject to criminal process. Although the Constitution and cases are explicit: criminal defendants are presumed innocent and the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the prosecution, 16 nevertheless the adverse effects of criminal stigma begin with mere accusation of a crime and culminate with conviction and criminal sanctions. Even if a defendant is acquitted, the adverse publicity of the initial criminal accusation may continue to have the effect of a punishment, especially if the acquittal is not publicized as widely as the initial indictment.
Thus, the first issue for policy-makers recommending, and for legislatures adopting, criminal competition provisions is whether or not antitrust violations such as price fixing, 13 The US Antitrust Division Manual directs the prosecution team to estimate the amount of time anticipated to present the case and warns that, if the "investigation will likely take a considerable number of sessions and a substantial amount of grand jury time, it is best to begin a new 18-month grand jury that will be empanelled specifically for antitrust investigations." (Antitrust Division Manual at III-84). Individuals and corporate representatives may be subpoenaed to testify and/or produce documents. Again, the process may be lengthy: "Subpoena recipients typically receive significant lead time to comply with subpoenas, but in exceptional circumstances when there is a risk of flight or destruction or fabrication of evidence, subpoenas may require speedy compliance, usually within one day. Such "forthwith" subpoenas should be used rarely and will likely be subject to close judicial scrutiny." (Antitrust Division Manual at III-85). 14 "After the indictment is returned, staff must notify the Office of Operations immediately and provide the docket number and the name of the judge, if available. The Office of Operations will inform the Office of Public Affairs, which will issue the press release." (Antitrust Division Manual at IV-63). The adverse effects of this publicization are implicitly recognized in the Manual, which requires that "Once the Office of Operations has been notified, it is customary for staff to call counsel for each defendant, inform them that an indictment has been returned, and give them the date of arraignment, if known. This courtesy is intended to give notice to defense counsel and defendants before they learn about the indictment from the news media." (Antitrust Division Manual at IV-63). 15 Antitrust Division Manual at IV-64 to IV-75. 16 U.S. Constitution Amendments V, VI, VII; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Justice Harlan, concurring, stated that "… I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on the fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."). Blackstone asserted that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer," 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *352 (1765). market allocation or bid rigging are morally blameworthy. Does the community condemn this type of economic behavior as blameworthy or merely a violation?
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Marathon Question: Are hardcore cartels "real crimes" that are morally blameworthy and deserve community condemnation and social stigma as well as economic punishment?
II.
Goals of the Marathon: Justifications for punishment
Marathoners have a variety of goals: novices just want to finish, repeat runners want to improve their times and skills, and elite runners want to win. Similarly, criminal laws, and attendant punishment, must be based on specific theoretical goals and justifications. Greenwalt points out that because "punishment" necessarily involves pain, any State that chooses to intentionally impose punishment must justify itself.
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HLA Hart concurs, identifying the primary question as "what is the general justifying aim of the criminal justice system?"
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There are basically only two justifications available for State-imposed punishment: the backward-looking retributive theory of just dessert and the forward-looking utilitarian deterrence justification.
A. The Utilitarian Justification of Deterrence
Economic crimes in general, and antitrust crimes in particular, are generally based on the theory of utilitarian deterrence. Bentham attributes all human action to the principle of utility, which is subject to "two sovereign masters;" the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.
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The legislature thus may opt to use instruments of pain and pleasure to effect its social goals. Specifically, Bentham asserts that punishment should be used as an instrument to achieve maximum social utility by deterring antisocial conduct. Of course, since punishment itself is painful, it is permitted only if it deters a greater social harm. Thus, Bentham rejects punishment as a means to the beneficial social end if it is groundless, inefficacious, unprofitable or needless. The morality of a particular act is irrelevant for utilitarian consequentialist theory, the only relevant inquiry is whether the utility principle is promoted. 17 The ALI Model Penal Code is instructive in making this distinction. The MPC classifies crimes, from the most to the least serious, as felonies, misdemeanors, petty misdemeanors and violations, § 1.04. Felony sentences include imprisonment for more than 1 year, misdemeanor and petty misdemeanor sentences are less than a year. A violation involves a sentence of no more than a fine, forfeiture or other civil penalty. "A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense, § 1.04(5). 18 Punishment for prohibited acts, although it causes pain, can be justified because it incapacitates the offender, specifically deters him or her from future crimes, promotes general deterrence by restraining others from the same crimes, and (may) reform the offender, who will refrain from further antisocial behavior.
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Utilitarian deterrence is the explicit basis for American criminalization of antitrust violations. 22 Barnett called for large financial penalties and jail time for individual offenders because "nothing is a greater deterrent and nothing is a greater incentive" for cooperation and recommended increased international criminal prohibitions because "adding more jurisdictions to the list of countries with criminal enforcement also increases deterrence since it raises the cost of entering or continuing in cartels."
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Hammond and Werden concur, pointing out the notable increase in U.S. criminal prosecutions, including those targeting international cartels, since the 1990s. 24 Refuting assertions of high recidivism, i.e. a failure of deterrence, Werden, Hammond and Barnett also assert that the most severe individual sanction, incarceration, have been effective specific deterrents. Their study concludes that neither convicted offenders (both corporate and individual) nor those granted conditional leniency had reoffended by participating in hardcore cartels in the United States after 1999.
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Despite the instrumental appeal of utilitarianism, Ashworth argues that harm prevention is a secondary function of criminal law and that punishing inchoate offenses may constitute overcriminalization. 26 He warns that "criminal law, as the most intrusive and condemnatory state mechanism, should be regarded as a last resort, or as a 'back-stop' for other non-criminal measures of prevention." This warning is most acute, however, when the mens rea of the "crime" does not require fault or is a strict liability regulatory offence. The U. S. Supreme Court addressed this concern in U.S. Gypsum, holding that Sherman Act prosecutions require a criminal mens rea, either that the conduct was done (1) with the purpose of causing anticompetitive effects or, (2) knowingly with respect to the likely consequences and produced 21 Greenwalt at 1286. 22 Chemtob stated that the Division's "core enforcement policy goal with respect to hard-core horizontal restraints has been the deterrence of these pernicious activities through active enforcement and heavy penalties on offenders." Stuart M. Even though the European competition articles are not criminal, the European Court of Human Rights addressed related issues in several cases and held that merely labeling proceedings as "civil" or "administrative" is not sufficient to evade criminal procedural safeguards. The key inquiry, the Court held, is whether the penalty was intended to be punitive or deterrent, irrespective of the labels.
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B. The Retributivist Non-Consequentialist Justification
Unlike utilitarian forward-looking deterrence, non-consequentialist theory is exclusively focused on just desserts punishment for antisocial acts. Offenders deserve punishment, in the retributivist view, because they are morally culpable.
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Unlike utilitarianism, which uses punishment instrumentally as a means to an end, the retributivist refuses to treat individuals as means. This Kantian justification for punishment asserts that "juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime."
32 Kant rejects any consequentialist justification, asserting that "the penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpentwindings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment."
If the categorical imperative requires all to be treated as ends and not means, then retributive theory would utterly reject a purely utilitarian justification for criminalizing antitrust violations, including hardcore cartels, market allocation and bid rigging conspiracies.
Marathon Question: what are the necessary justifications for criminal punishment? Is utilitarian deterrence sufficient to punish? If deterring hardcore cartels is the only social benefit good to be gained, how is maximum deterrence to be achieved with maximum efficiency, that is, increasing overall social utility and minimizing individual pain? 
III. Training for Marathons: Reviewing Criminal Enforcement Policy
Violation of American antitrust laws has been criminal since Sherman Act § § 1 and 2 were adopted in 1890. 33 Initially misdemeanors, violations of these sections were raised to felonies in 1974, and penalties have been steadily increased under the statute and the recommendations of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. 34 In modern practice, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has limited its criminal actions to a much smaller subset of cases than are statutorily authorized. Monopolization is not prosecuted as a crime under § 2 and it is highly unlikely that any rule of reason ccase under § § 1 or 2 could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Antitrust Division's internal standards for opting for criminal, as opposed to civil, sanctions are spelled out explicitly in the Division Manual and are highly demanding:
[T]here are some situations where the decision to proceed by criminal or civil investigation requires considerable deliberation. In general, current Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving horizontal, per se unlawful agreements such as price fixing, bid rigging, and customer and territorial allocations. Civil process and, if necessary, civil prosecution is used with respect to other suspected antitrust violations, including those that require analysis under the rule of reason as well as some offenses that historically have been labeled "per se" by the courts. There are a number of situations where, although the conduct may appear to be a per se violation of law, criminal investigation or prosecution may not be appropriate. These situations may include cases in which (1) the case law is unsettled or uncertain; (2) there are truly novel issues of law or fact presented; (3) confusion reasonably may have been caused by past prosecutorial decisions; or (4) there is clear evidence that the subjects of the investigation were not aware of, or did not appreciate, the consequences of their action."
35
It is little-noted, but many of the early leading antitrust cases were, in fact, criminal prosecutions rather than civil actions, confirming the American focus on criminal prosecution of 33 Section 1 (15 U.S.C. § 1) provides: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." Section 2 (15 U.S.C. § 2) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." 34 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (1974 The U.S. Antitrust Division is committed to criminal prosecution for hardcore cartels on the utilitarian deterrence theory, analogizing antitrust conspiracies to such traditional property crimes as burglary or larceny.
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The Division Manual articulates standards for criminal prosecution that are consistent with the goal of actively pursuing criminal sanctions:
In a matter where the suspected conduct appears to meet the Division's standard for proceeding criminally, the decision whether to open an investigation will depend on two questions. The first is whether the allegations or suspicions of a criminal violation are sufficiently credible or plausible to call for a criminal investigation. This is a matter of prosecutorial discretion and is based on the experience of the approving officials; legal authorities may also provide guidance. The second question is whether the matter is significant. Determining which matters are significant is a flexible, matter-by-matter analysis that involves consideration of a number of factors, including the volume of commerce affected; the nature of the conduct; the breadth of the geographic area impacted (including whether the matter is international); the potential for expansion of the investigation or prosecution from a particular geographic area or industry to an investigation or prosecution in other areas or industries; the deterrent impact and visibility of the investigation or prosecution; the degree of culpability of the conspirators (e.g., the duration of the conspiracy, the amount of overcharge, any acts of coercion or disciplining of cheaters); and whether the suspected conduct directly impacted the Federal Government. Because the Division's mission requires it to seek redress for any criminal antitrust conspiracy that victimizes the Federal Government and, therefore, injures American taxpayers, this last factor is potentially by itself dispositive. The Division is committed to prosecuting all matters of major significance and will ensure resources are assigned accordingly." 48 Werden et al. argue that the entire range of criminal sanctions must be available for convicted antitrust offenders, from corporate and individual fines to individual imprisonment. Arguing to the contrary, in the context of overall white collar crime cases, Judge Posner asserts that the optimal sanctions in white collar violations should be limited to civil fines, eliminating the criminal stigma and incarceration of prosperous individuals and firms as both unprofitable and unnecessary. Rev. 409 (1980) . Judge Posner's specific objection to white collar crimes, as opposed to white collar civil violations, is that the costs of criminal prosecution outweigh the benefits. For example, assuming that the stigma of conviction has some measurable deterrent effect on individuals and corporations, the stigma should be monetized in the form of a civil fine remitted to the government. Even more seriously, there is a positive expense involved in incarcerating an individual, who will generate little if any revenue in prison but could continue to contribute to social wealth by paying a high fine and continuing to be employed. Incarceration, in other words, constitutes deadweight loss. The simple economics compel the conclusion that, "[f]or every prison sentence there is some fine equivalent; if the fine is so large that it cannot be collected, then the offender should be imprisoned." 50 A fine is less expensive and just as efficacious as a deterrent if the fine is set at the proper level. Indeed, Judge Posner concludes, civil antitrust liability may be more properly limited to corporations rather than individuals because firms are more likely to be able to pay deterrence-level fines and will have private methods to sanction and deter their rogue employees.
Moreover, the criminal process itself imposes costs that do not exist in the world of civil fines, penalties or administrative sanctions. 51 Costs associated with criminal punishment include the challenge of proving the antitrust violation beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD) since the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains on the prosecution in criminal and civil actions. Even in per se horizontal cartel cases requiring little or no economic analysis, juries may be reluctant to find a white collar individual or well-known firm guilty, rather than merely liable, without an overwhelming quantum of evidence and proof of the all-important immorality in behavior. Any confusion in definitions of the criminal actus reus and, importantly, the mens rea, will handicap prosecutors held to the BRD standard of proof. Moreover, the law is far from settled and continues to evolve with respect to jurisdictional requirements in cases that involve conduct that is partially or entirely extraterritorial. 52 Criminal prosecutions also require strict observance of procedural protections ranging from pre-indictment Constitutional warnings, mandatory disclosures, to the cost and time investment in lengthy grand jury proceedings. Kadish tends to agree that there are "major problems" associated with white collar crimes. However, at least on the first problem, defining the proscribed conduct, he finds that the Antitrust Division's voluntary limitation of criminal proceedings to per se horizontal cartels mitigates the objection. The other objections, defining corporate criminality and the critical requirement of moral culpability, are less tractable. Finally, there are costs associated with prosecuting cartels in an environment dominated by civil and administrative proceedings, especially when a key counterparty is the European Commission. There is consensus that amnesty or leniency policies vastly facilitate antitrust actions, whether they are civil or criminal in nature. The 2011 International Competition Network Good Practices include the following recommendations:
"It is good practice to make leniency available both where the agency is unaware of the cartel and where the agency is aware of the cartel but the agency does not have sufficient evidence to proceed to adjudicate or prosecute."
Moreover, "Where applicable, it is good practice for agencies to encourage leniency applicants to apply for leniency in other jurisdictions where cartel conduct also occurred" "It is good practice for competition enforcement authorities to ask leniency applicants if they have applied for leniency in other jurisdictions, and if so, what conditions, if any, have been imposed. This may assist coordination between agencies."
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The difficulties are obvious, and recognized by the ICN Good Practices, which provide that, in parallel civil and criminal systems, "it is important that the application of the leniency policy to civil and criminal cartel conduct is clearly articulated to provide maximum certainty to potential applicants."
The United States 55 and European
Commission, 56 as well as numerous other competition agencies, have robust leniency programs.
They are parallel systems, never meeting when the Antitrust Division opts for criminal remedies barred to the Commission. Indeed, the due process and confidentiality issues discussed above are especially acute in the amnesty/leniency context. Leniency is a recognized benefit to antitrust violators and government enforcers and American officials agree that "a major development in cartel enforcement over the past quarter century was the advent of leniency programs…" 57 Some cases may be impossible in the absence of cooperating witnesses who insist on leniency. But amnesty seekers likely will insist on global amnesty or absolute ) have illegally fixed prices on air cargo shipments by adding agreed-upon charges including fuel surcharges and inspection fees to the prices for shipments. The prices were set at periodic meetings of the airline executives held in State E. Air cargo shipments are global and the illegally fixed prices had direct, substantial and foreseeable effects in both the European Union and the United States. It can be proven that the agreement intended to raise prices in these jurisdictions and did so. Hypothetical # 2. Four electronics producers are under investigation for agreeing to fix prices for LCD display screens and CRT screens used in high-end televisions and other electronic products. One of the firms is headquartered in a European country, one is American, and the remaining two are located in separate Asian countries.
The Commission has civil enforcement authority, and the European state may enforce Art. 101 and its own national competition law but lacks a private right of action. The US DOJ has criminal and civil authority and private parties injured by the cartel may bring private actions for treble damages. Both Asian countries have government competition enforcement agencies; one authorizes civil or criminal enforcement, the other only has civil enforcement power. All of the products are manufactured in the same country, which is not the location of any of the firms. The country of manufacture has a competition law that prohibits price fixing, has a new but relatively active civil enforcement government agency and also allows for private actions. All of the products are shipped in global commerce and sold to consumers worldwide.
A. You represent the smallest firm and your client would like to be the first to blow the whistle and obtain immunity. How do you proceed? Where? 
